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In 1999 there appeared in The New York Review o f  Books a review by Andrew 
Delbanco of some seven studies (all but one of them published in the period 1997-99) 
which included Alvin Keman’s The Death o f Literature and Robert Scholes’s The 
Rise and Fall o f  English. On the basis of such titles Delbanco’s piece appeared under 
the heading, ‘The Decline and Fall of Literature’.1 While some years have elapsed 
since the appearance of the review, and while some of the points made have more 
relevance to North American than Irish universities, the arguments put forward are 
still worth revisiting, if only to provide a starting-point for what is, in its very nature, 
an ongoing debate.
Delbanco reminds us that English has been an established and respected part of the 
university curriculum for a comparatively short period (thus, the English honours 
degree was established in Oxford only in 1894: Delbanco, p. 3). One defence against 
those who tended to dismiss the fledgling subject of English as ‘chatter about Shelley’ 
was the one associated most famously with Matthew Arnold—to study literature in 
English (all the more needful, given that literature in the native language was more 
readily accessible than literature in Greek and Latin) was to broaden one’s cultural 
awareness (of which more later); but also to acquire an ethical orientation. Culture, 
said Arnold, ‘moves by the force, not merely or primarily of the scientific passion for 
pure knowledge, but also of the moral and social passion for doing good’. One way 
of becoming more morally sensitive through the reading of literature was to feel, 
through empathic identification with character and situation, for the plight of fictional 
others (or even, to use the more contemporary term, of ‘the Other’). That one should 
develop a heightened moral sense was all the more important in an age in which 
Christian belief was being steadily eroded, and the norm became either sophisticated 
agnosticism or religious indifference. This ambition receives programmatic 
embodiment in the fiction—notably, for example, in Middlemarch (1871-72)—of 
George Eliot, who herself had lost her Christian faith by the time she was twenty-one, 
and undertook to devote to the ethical the kind of passion hitherto devoted to religious 
belief. (I shall return at the end of the article to the general question of the possible 
connection between literature and ethics.)
The Amoldian programme of broadening one’s cultural awareness (to speak of that in 
more detail) may at times seem culpably vague, but it entailed, in Delbanco’s useful 
summary, the idea of becoming ‘aware of the past and restless with the complacencies 
of the present’ (p. 7). This would, then, provide the basis for that passion for 
improvement in the present state of affairs (Arnold’s ‘moral and social passion for 
doing good’). In Arnold’s own formula, ‘culture is a pursuit o f  our total perfection by 
means of getting to know , the best that has been thought and said in the world; and 
through this knowledge, turning a stream of fresh and free thought upon our stock 
notions and habits... ’ (C and A, ‘Preface’, p. 7).3 One should fairly acknowledge that 
this sense of the transformative power of culture (and of literature) contains a radical 
dimension; though the radicalism does not seek to embody itself in any defining 
ideology (indeed, Arnold’s repeated emphasis upon the virtue of ‘disinterestedness’— 
as in his essay on ‘The Function of Criticism at the Present Time’ (1864)—acts as a
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warning against any a priori ideological commitment).4 One can nonetheless validate, 
and add some (perhaps much-needed) intellectual respectability to Arnold’s radical 
credentials, by indicating his possible affinity with the views (expressed with a greater 
degree of theoretical sophistication) of a member of the neo-Marxist Frankfurt 
School, Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse, in pursuit of the argument that art provides an 
ideal alternative which implicitly acts as a critique of the real, existing social order, 
holds that the ‘affirmative character of art’ is per se revolutionary in its effect. Art 
(including imaginative literature), in its imagining o f ideal alternatives ‘contradicts’ 
the prevalent repressive order, and it does so because it ‘subverts the dominant 
consciousness, the ordinary experience’ (recall Arnold on the dispelling of ‘stock 
notions and habits’). In a succinct summary, Marcuse puts it in these terms: ‘The 
autonomy of art [offering its own better ‘world’ or heterocosm] contains the 
categorical imperative: “things must change’” ,5
(Literature has behind it what by now, after many years, amounts to a radical tradition 
of subversion: a subversive tendency expressed in one of its most telling forms in 
William Blake’s declaration in the Romantic period: ‘the Poet is Independent & 
Wicked; the Philosopher is Dependent & Good’,6 Probably, if there is one slogan 
which might unite all, or almost all, of those involved in teaching in English 
departments (whatever their individual ideological stances), it will be found in those 
words of Blake; or in some such alternative formula as that which endorses in the 
critic a suspicion o f accepted orthodoxies commensurate with that attributed to the 
poet/author: ‘When in Rome, do as the Greeks’.)
According to Delbanco (pp. 7-8), as long as teachers of literature ‘acknowledged their 
responsibility for transmitting culture’ in the sense indicated above, ‘they held a 
dignified position in the university’. But the ‘sad news’, he adds, ‘is that teachers of 
literature have lost faith in their subject and in themselves’ (p. 9: a summary of the 
state o f affairs in English departments which we should acknowledge as limited, but 
one that may serve to advance the argument for the time being). For this ‘lost faith’ 
one may (extrapolating from Delbanco rather than simply summarising his argument) 
suggest a number of reasons:
(1) the desire to justify the study of English on scientific/quantitative grounds;
(2) in a related development, the genesis of a specialist vocabulary which, 
giving rise to theoretical jargon, threatens to close literature off from the 
‘naive’ or theoretically untutored reader, and from the immediacy of 
his/her imaginative/emotional response;
(3) the reluctance or inability to adopt, or appear to adopt, an apolitical stance 
(‘disinterestedness’) in the face o f palpable injustices and abuses o f power 
(hence the rise of parti pris positions, as, for example, in feminism or 
colonial/postcolonial studies);
(4) the rise of postmodernism and with it a far-reaching scepticism which, 
denying foundational truth, calls likewise into question the truth-content of 
literature.
It may be useful to take each o f these in turn.
(1) Delbanco notes (pp. 6-7) that from the outset English professors in the late 
nineteenth century (an age when scientific positivism and related intellectual attitudes
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held sway) chose to defend the subject of English by incorporating what he generally 
describes as ‘literary “science”’ (philology, for example, or fact-based biography, or 
textual scholarship which attempted to establish the ‘true’ or ‘actual’ text). The field 
of English, as Delbanco (p. 1'4) further notes, has gone on being deeply ambivalent 
about science: it ‘distrusts science, but it yearns to be scientific’; and he refers to the 
notorious hoax perpetrated by the physicist Alan Sokal, in which Sokal (wickedly) 
submitted ‘a deliberately fraudulent article full o f pseudoscientific gibberish to a 
leading cultural studies journal, which promptly published it’ (gibberish and all). 
Francis Wheen, providing an extended account of the hoax, notes that not only was 
the spoof article ‘littered with scientific howlers and absurdities’, but, more to the 
point, that ‘the postmodernists’ attempts to discredit Sokal were hampered by the fact 
that his article ... included dozens of genuine quotations from their own work’.7 That 
is to say, the postmodernists, enamoured of the scientific, stand indicted of the 
reckless use of (pseudo)scientific terms.
(2) It is the ambition of theory to present itself as a ‘hard’ discipline (like science) that 
generates an interest in such specialised, quasi-scientific terminology, as was the case 
with deconstruction. The consequence, as Delbanco notes (p. 11), was that literary 
studies fell ‘into the grip of a peculiarly repellent jargon—repellent in the literal sense 
of pushing readers away’.8 The readers here mentioned may be supposed to be 
lineally descended from Dr Samuel Johnson’s ‘common reader’, famously mentioned 
in his ‘Life of Gray’ as the arbiter of whether or not Gray’s Elegy is a great poem; for 
‘by the common sense of readers uncorrupted with literary prejudices, after all the 
refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, must be finally decided all 
claim to poetical honours’.9 From certain theoretical perspectives, Johnson’s views 
may seem naive (for example, if  by ‘common reader’ he means to indicate a 
universally representative one, then the retort might be that he may in fact be guilty of 
setting up a white European male and dubbing him Everyman); but if we take 
‘common’ to mean ‘ordinary’, then Johnson does at least deflect any charges of 
intellectual elitism.
The distinction or indeed conflict between the common or naive reader, and the 
theoretically sophisticated one, is perhaps a topic that calls for more extended 
discussion than it is usually accorded. What is of additional interest is that the conflict 
can arise, not just between two types of reader, but within the individual. Most 
teachers of literature will usually, if pressed, admit to such an experience of self­
division, even if they do not pause to analyse it. One major critic, however, who has 
recently pondered the problem at some length, is J. Hillis Miller, himself a reader o f 
the highest critical and theoretical sophistication. He admits that because people ‘have 
a healthy fear of the power literary works have to instill what may be dangerous or 
unjust assumptions about race, gender, or class’, then an interrogative mode of 
reading is essential, for this can reveal how ‘modes of vision, judgement and action’, 
which are ‘presented as objectively true’, are ‘actually ideological’. Yet elsewhere he 
finds himself obliged to advocate ‘an innocent, childlike abandonment to the act of 
reading, without suspicion, reservation, or interrogation’; for unless ‘one has 
performed that innocent first reading, nothing much exists to resist or criticize’. What 
worries him is the fear that the book may be ‘deprived beforehand, by a principled 
resistance to literature’s power, of much chance to have a significant effect on its 
readers’.10 One may take this to mean that the text will not live for the reader 
(generate a ‘power’) unless s/he is willing to make a significant
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imaginative/emotional investment (in a state of ‘childlike abandonment’, or what he 
elsewhere calls ‘innocent credulity’) in what it has to offer. We are obliged, however, 
to acknowledge that ever since the formulation, at the height of the ‘New Criticism’, 
o f the ‘affective fallacy’ (by W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. Beardsley, in The Verbal 
Icon: Studies in the Meaning o f  Poetry, 1946), the affective appeal of literature, and 
the validity of the reader’s emotional response, have been increasingly relegated to 
the margins.
(3) The refusal to accept an apolitical stance as seemingly advocated by Arnold 
(though in fact Arnold is usually found by those who reject his ideal of 
‘disinterestedness’ to be himself ideologically conditioned and limited) has, on the 
face of it, much that is commendable. As Miller suggests above, apparently ‘innocent’ 
texts need to be interrogated so that they reveal their ‘dangerous or unjust 
assumptions’. Both within and outside literature, there are, obviously, abuses of 
power and imbalances in the distribution o f power, that need to be critically exposed 
in the prevalent culture, whether in gender relations, in the stereotyping or general 
treatment o f homosexuals, in the relations between the developed and the developing 
worlds, or in the ruthless (if kid-gloved) exploitation of the consumer by global 
capitalism.
One can argue that cultural theory was an attempt to keep radical, left-wing politics 
alive in the era of Thatcher and Reagan, the result being that literature, and the critical 
analyses of it, became ‘politics by other means’. To those, however, who adopted 
such a position it might be retorted that the radical views formulated in the study and 
articulated on campus or via the campus bookshop are no real substitute for political 
activism. It would be too dismissive to suggest, on the model of W. H. Auden’s 
famous pronouncement in ‘In Memory of W. B. Yeats’ (‘poetry makes nothing 
happen’), that cultural theory has little or no practical effect; but one might still 
paraphrase T. S. Eliot’s dismissal of Arnold’s view of poetry as a substitute for 
religion and philosophy, ‘nothing in this world or the next is a substitute for anything 
else; and if you find that you must do without something, such as religious faith or 
philosophic belief [or, we add, an active engagement in politics], then you must just 
do without it’.11
As to just how effective a politicised theory can be, here is Delbanco’s damaging 
assessment (p. 14) of the political orientation that the study of English has recently 
sought to embody: ‘The louder it cries about the high political stakes in its own 
squabbles, the less resemblance it maintains to anything resembling real politics’. His 
next sentence is even more damning: ‘by failing to promote literature as a means by 
which students become aware of their unexamined assumptions and glimpse worlds 
different from their own [according, that is, to the Amoldian ideal o f cultured 
awareness], the self-consciously radical English department has become a force for 
conservatism’.12 Significantly, one should add, it is not only Delbanco who has 
queried the political effectiveness of theory: in two works published in 1996 and 2003 
respectively, the Marx-inspired critic Terry Eagleton has also questioned the radical 
credentials of cultural theory.13
(4) Delbanco’s phrase about a ‘lost faith’, quoted earlier, can be applied only with 
major qualification to those who sought to embrace political radicalism: their 
intention, rather, was to replace an outmoded faith (as they saw it) with a more
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authentic one. The deepest insecurity, however, experienced by the English teacher 
(and in other humanities subjects as well) can indeed be correctly described as one 
that entails a loss of faith; and it is a loss of faith that affects Western culture at large. 
In this connection, Delbanco (pp. 9-10) traces the development from the ‘New Critics’ 
to the emergence o f deconstruction whereby what began as a revelling in ‘language 
play’, and the recognition that ‘words were never quite governed by the author’, 
culminated in a belief that ‘the “referentiality” of language to anything outside itself is 
an illusion’. Thus the possible ‘truth-content’ o f literature, or even its humbler (and 
long-established) aspiration to mimesis (understood as a rendering or, less 
ambitiously, an imitation of the real) is rendered suspect. In the summary provided by 
Terry Eagleton, ‘the “real” is undecidable’, is ‘a paralysing scepticism’ which obliges 
postmodernism to display a ‘nervousness about such concepts as truth’, and to ‘place 
words like “reality” in scare quotes’ (Illusions, pp. 27-28). Moreover, as Delbanco 
notes (pp. 12-13), once ‘leading Figures in literary studies’ began, in a post­
structuralist era, to deny to literature ‘even the residual aspiration to positive 
knowledge that structuralism expressed’, the very ‘idea of rightness or wrongness in 
any reading was rendered incoherent’. And Delbanco provides (p. 13) a succinct 
summary, from Louis Menand’s What's Happened to the Humanities?, o f the self- 
thwarting contradiction in which literary studies found itself: English as a discipline 
tended to become ‘“hard” and ironic at the same time’, emphasising ‘theoretical 
rigour and simultaneously debunk[ing] all claims to objective knowledge’.
Francis Wheen might well relate such a contradiction to that ‘paralysis of reason’ 
which is, for him, part of ‘the enfeebling legacy of post-modernism’ (Mumbo-Jumho, 
p. 115). It is, with regard to the denial of the linguistic representation of reality, a 
paralysis that threatens not just the literary critic/theorist but any author who tries to 
hold on to the belief that s/he might have something significant to say about the 
reality of our human situation. No wonder that Julian Barnes felt it necessary in the 
late eighties to take a stand, and affirm the possibility of access (however qualified) to 
‘objective truth’. This, he acknowledges, is never fully obtainable; but even while we 
know this, we must continue to believe ‘that objective truth is obtainable; or we must 
believe it is 99 per cent obtainable; or if we can’t believe this we must believe that 43 
per cent objective truth is better than 41 per cent. We must do so, because if we don’t 
we’re lo s t... \ 14
There is, however, no logical compulsion to accept a radical scepticism that denies the 
possibility of objective knowledge; for, in a self-contradiction most philosophers will 
be familiar with, a radical sceptic cannot make the affirmation that no objective 
knowledge is possible, given that the very position he wishes to articulate precludes 
any such confident assertion. Scepticism, in the words of a commentator on Hegel’s 
comment on the self-contradiction inherent in scepticism, ‘is pure negativity’, and 
‘cannot provide itself with any positive position to occupy’.15 Consequently, it would 
seem, scepticism would be logically obliged to bind itself, like all the rest of us, to 
silence; a recipe for the suspension of enquiry and debate. As the author informs us 
toward the end of Chapter XXII of Middlemarch: ‘Scepticism, as we know, can never 
be thoroughly applied, else life would come to a standstill ... \ 16 Moreover, as the 
pragmatist William James was at pains to insist, even if  purely objective truth ‘is 
nowhere to be found’,17 yet, as beings who exist in a real and exigent world we are 
obliged for practical purposes to commit ourselves—on whatever evidence, limited 
though it be, that is available—to real decisions; to act, we might say, as if  we are in
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fact responding to the truth of a given situation.18 And ‘acting as if  we are responding 
to the truth of a given situation’ is a practical habit we can and do carry over into our 
reading of literature.
♦
It would be both reactionary and naive to lament the changes that have occurred in 
English studies over the past few decades. Delbanco, for example, accepts (p. 12) that 
much of what happened in the ‘the Sixties’ (and, we might add, thereafter) was 
‘salutary’; and he instances the ‘healthy’ debate over the literary ‘canon’, and the 
historicist/cultural materialist analysis o f the cultural formation as a locus of 
suppressive and insidious power. Nor could one regret the many insights arising from 
feminism (one minor but significant example being the invigorating re-reading of 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, which has restored the text to a central position in the 
writing of the English Romantic era); or the widening of our perspective to 
accommodate what Delbanco calls (p. 5) ‘the global literature of decolonization’ 
(especially as that was encouraged by such an astute critical practitioner as Edward 
Said).
Without seeking, however, to return to the older beliefs and attitudes of Matthew 
Arnold or, say, the ‘New Critics’ (with their sensitivity to the specifically ‘poetic’ 
organisation of the text), one may still, with some validity, regret the loss of certain 
traditional emphases in the study of English. One of the chief fears is (and perhaps 
ought to be) that students will lose both the appetite and ability to engage with the 
specifics (stylistic and, in a broad sense, rhetorical) of the literary text. The tendency 
in some critical quarters to collapse the distinction between poiesis, that which is 
avowedly literary, and writing as a whole (including critical writing), subsuming 
everything under the all-inclusive category of ‘discourse’, has done no favours to the 
high aesthetic claims of the poetic/metaphorical. Thus Patricia Waugh, dealing with 
‘postmodern textuality’, states that ‘theory’ cannot be seen to occupy a radically 
different order of discourse from that occupied by ‘fiction’, and quotes from Paul de 
Man’s Blindness and Insight the view that a text can operate equally through 
‘declarative statement or poetic ... inference’, and that a ‘discursive, critical or 
philosophic text that does this by means of statements is not therefore more or less 
literary than a poetic text that would avoid direct statement ... ’. For, in de Man’s 
view, the ‘criterion of literary specificity does not depend on the greater or lesser 
discursivenes of the mode ... We are invited, then, to regard the writing of, say, 
the late Henry James as no more ‘literary’ than the jargon-laden effusions of the 
critical theorist. Thus is the way prepared for the eunuchs to take over the seraglio. 
More seriously, once English studies fails to insist on the essential distinction between 
poetic/literary discourse and other kinds of discourse, the unique appeal of the literary 
is lost; more damagingly still, the entire raison d ’&tre of English studies as a separate, 
stand-alone discipline, operating within parameters proper to itself, is put in jeopardy.
Delbanco concludes (p. IS) on an upbeat note by referring to some ‘hopeful signs’: 
among them, ‘talk of “defending the literary”, and the return of beauty as a legitimate 
subject for analysis and appreciation’. Among those who have consistently refused to 
surrender the difference between literary or poetic discourse, and what one is tempted 
to call merely prepositional discourse, is the superlative Murray Krieger. The literary 
work, he insists, must be seen to possess a special complexity or multi-dimensionality 
because of ‘the manipulations worked upon ordinary language to make it function as
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extraordinarily as it does in our best literature’. Indeed, he adds, it is this ‘manifold 
complexity’ that always threatens to reveal ‘the potential inadequacy of theory’.20 
Such an empowering of the literary text—crucial to the health of literary studies— 
may well have to come about, it seems, at the expense of an overweening critical 
theory.
But one of the strongest defences of the specifically literary derives from a source that 
will perhaps seem, on the face o f it, surprising: the moral philosopher and classicist, 
Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum, however, possesses not only a passionate interest in 
imaginative literature, but a particular fascination with, and sensitivity to, the fiction 
of Henry James. At one point, dismissing ‘a criticism that simply mines the [literary] 
work for a set o f prepositional clauses’ (a reductive manoeuvre to which the 
ideologically motivated critic should remain continually alert), she calls for ‘an 
investigation of that which is expressed and “claimed” by the shape of the sentences 
themselves, by images and cadences and pauses themselves, by the forms of the 
traditional genres, by narrativity, themselves’.21
This kind of thorough recognition of the specifically literary, however, constitutes 
only a part (and that a subordinate one) of Nussbaum’s larger argument; and that 
larger argument leads us to (or back to) the question o f the deeply significant 
connection between literature and ethics. One reason that Nussbaum so admires James 
is that she finds, enacted or dramatised in his fiction, the kind o f particularised 
treatment of morality which is not covered by ethical generalisation. In this she sees 
James as continuous with Aristotle, who in the Nicomachean Ethics recognised that 
there are some things ‘about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general 
terms’, and that thus the law is ‘defective on account of its generality’ 22 It is the 
requirement of particularisation that leads to the acknowledgement of the literary 
finesse of James; for what we need from an ethical point of view are ‘texts which 
display to us the complexity, the indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty of moral choice’, 
and which show us, in addition, ‘the refusal of life involved in fixing everything in 
advance according to some system of inviolable rules’. What is required, then, is a 
style which can ‘convey the way in which “the matter of the practical” appears before 
the agent in all its bewildering complexity, without its morally salient features 
stamped upon its face’ (Love’s Knowledge, pp. 141-42). It is for that reason that we 
shall need to turn to ‘texts no less elaborate, no less linguistically fine-tuned, concrete 
and intensely focused, no less metaphorically resourceful’ than James’s The Golden 
Bowl (Love’s Knowledge, p. 157).
One should note incidentally that Nussbaum takes it for granted that James’s fiction 
does indeed possess a truth-content (the proof of both its reality and its relevance 
discovered in the imaginative commitment of the reader). To put it in the most general 
terms, Nussbaum’s approach suggests that great literature such as James’s last novels 
matters, that it is full of real import, that it speaks to us of such perennial concerns as 
the quest for virtue and the highest good. It is the recognition of some such possible 
function of literature as this which might return us to the habits of impassioned 
reading and interpretation. The main point o f Nussbaum’s argument, however, is that 
it is the very literariness of great literature that enables it to do something which 
cannot elsewhere, in any other mode, be done. And this is one way of defending the 
unique character and claims o f the literary.
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The defence o f the specifically literary as a special mode of discourse is essential for 
the lasting health o f literary studies and the very survival, perhaps, o f the English 
department. Valuable as the insights offered by cultural studies may be, they should 
not be arrived at through the marginalisation or denial of those properties which 
belong to literature and to no other form of discourse. It is significant and a little 
troubling that a number of texts thought essential for the student and teacher of 
English (such as Eagleton’s The Illusions o f  Postmodernism) should be located in the 
section in the library reserved for Sociology. But one must continue to insist that the 
study of English is quite definitely not the same as the study of Sociology; just as, for 
similar reasons, the study of English is not the same as the study of Philosophy, or of 
History, or of Politics, or of Anthropology (though literature has these and other 
disciplines as adjacencies, and may have pertinent contributions to make to them). 
And one way of marking the uniqueness of literature is to insist on the reality of the 
category of the literary.
*
There is a further positive note on which one may end. Delbanco, looking (p. 4) at the 
American situation, reports that ‘many “traditional” students ... are turning away 
from literature in particular and from the humanities in general already in high 
school’, with the expected knock-on effect at third level. Thankfully, this does not 
appear to be the case in Ireland (and certainly not in Maynooth, where the number of 
students taking English is at an all-time high). Thanks in part to our Nobel Prize 
winners for Literature (the most recent being Seamus Heaney, about a decade ago), 
literature and, by extension, the study of literature at third level, continue to enjoy 
both prestige and popularity. The downside at Maynooth, of course, is that the 
increase in the number of students has not been matched by a commensurate increase 
in full-time teaching staff.
Delbanco suggests (p. 13) that traditionally the English department has been ‘a weak 
force in the politics of the university’. The real problem in this regard, though, lies in 
the political attitudes outside the university. It is difficult if not impossible to quantify 
the contribution of an English department to the economy or to the market-place, or 
indeed to defend what it does on strictly utilitarian grounds (though if Arnold is right, 
attempting to stimulate a ‘free play of mind’ must surely contribute to the 
preservation of democracy, and a literary criticism that emphasises the plurality of 
readings in a literary text might, as a corollary, encourage a wider sense of (cultural) 
pluralism). That is, however, a major theme that lies outside the scope o f the present 
article. In the meantime, we might—just might—begin to believe in the possibility of 
persuading the government and the Minister for Education to place a higher value on 
what English departments contribute, if we who teach English recover some of the 
confidence we once possessed, and accept, for a start, that we are central, if not to the 
university as a whole, then at least to the humanities. For it may still be true, as 
Delbanco suggests (p. 8), that ‘the condition of the English department is a pretty 
reliable measure of the state of liberal education in general’.
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